McKeon Opening Statement for Hearing on President Obama’s New Plan for Missile Defense in Europe and the Implications for International Security

 The U.S. House Armed Services Committee today held a hearing on President Obama’s new plan for missile defenses in Europe and the implications for international security.  Ranking Member Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (R-CA) released the following opening statement for the full committee hearing:

“It is a privilege to welcome our distinguished witnesses here today: General Cartwright, Secretary Flournoy, and General O’Reilly.  In particular, I would like to extend a warm welcome back to the gentle lady from California, our colleague and now Undersecretary of State, Ellen Tauscher. 

“Our hearing today focuses on the Administration’s decision to scrap plans for deploying a European missile defense capability in Poland and the Czech Republic to protect Europe and the United States.  My colleague has voiced broad support for the Administration’s new approach.  Let me simply say, I’m skeptical.  I think it has some merit.  But, as I weigh all the costs and benefits of the decision, both quantitative and qualitative, I do not come to the same conclusion.  I think there are questionable assumptions, a lot of “ifs,” and considerable geopolitical consequences.

“A key justification for the Administration’s decision is a new threat assessment which suggests that the threat from Iran’s longer-range ballistic missiles has been slower to develop, while it’s short and medium-range ballistic missiles are growing more rapidly than previously expected.  It is a sudden change, and inconsistent with the frequent briefings, intelligence reports, and testimony the committee has received from intelligence and defense officials. 

“In March 2009, General Craddock, then Commander of U.S. European Command testified before the committee, “By 2015 Iran may also deploy an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile capable of reaching all of Europe and parts of the U.S.”  In May 2009, an unclassified intelligence report issued by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center stated, “With sufficient foreign assistance, Iran could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015.” 

“Despite this expert testimony and information, there seems to be this certainty within the Administration that the Iranians can’t develop an IRBM or ICBM by 2015, and that these aren’t “real” threats to be worried about.  Does this certainty consider foreign assistance?  Because as we all know, Iran continues to work closely with North Korea, who themselves appear to be pursuing ICBMs. 

“Does this certainty account for uncertainty?  Intelligence is a fickle business, especially when a country is determined to mask its activities.  Friday’s revelation that Iran is building a covert uranium enrichment facility is a case in point.  A December 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) judged that covert uranium enrichment efforts were “halted.”  Less than two years later, they’re not.  The NIE also highlighted significant intelligence gaps and shortfalls.  So I’m skeptical when I hear Administration officials talk in such absolute terms that the long-range missile threat isn’t as quick to develop. 

“We are all concerned by the proliferation and growth in short- and medium-range missiles.  They are a threat to our allies, particularly in the Middle East and Asia, and to our forward-deployed troops.  Thus, increasing our theater missile defenses is incredibly important.  However, as I understood the previous plan, the 10 interceptors in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic would be complemented by expanding theater missile defense capabilities such as Aegis, THAAD, Patriot, and Allied systems to cover the shorter-range areas.  All NATO heads of state and government signed on to this basic approach at the April 2008 Bucharest Summit. 

“The testimonies submitted by our witnesses also emphasize that this new “phased, adaptive approach” is more cost-effective, with proven technology, and provides more comprehensive coverage of Europe sooner than the previous plan.  I would like to understand these assertions because, frankly, with the information I have before me, I’m having a hard time believing them.  

“According to a 2008 independent report required by this committee, the Czech and Polish proposal was the most cost-effective solution to protect the U.S. and Europe.  Another study, done earlier this year by the Congressional Budget Office, examined sea- and land-based alternatives and came to a similar conclusion. 

“As I understand it, Phase One and Phase Two of the new approach provide only modest coverage of Europe.  Of course, this depends on the number of ships available and locations where those ships would be deployed.  Given the demands on the Navy’s surface fleet in CENTCOM, PACOM, AFRICOM, and others, dedicating those ships to the European theater will be challenging to say the least.  These phases also require the development and acquisition of new sensor technologies.  Let’s make one thing clear about this policy: if this new approach is to match its predecessor in terms of dedicated coverage we will either need new ships or we will have to take ships away from other missions.

“Protection for most of Europe against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles isn’t provided until 2018, and protection of the U.S. against ICBMs until 2020.  Protection of the U.S. requires a new interceptor—the SM-3 Block IIB that I would characterize as a “paper” missile.   

“Should Iran have an IRBM or ICBM capability by 2015, or even 2018, this new approach could leave parts of Europe and the U.S. vulnerable for several years.  Are we offering Tehran an open invitation to focus on longer-range missile development? 

“Aside from the technical and cost concerns, I am particularly troubled by the geopolitical consequences of the Administration’s decision, starting with its effect on our relationships with friends and allies.  The Czech Republic and Poland, who have troops in Afghanistan fighting alongside U.S. forces, went out on a limb.  The U.S. government made a commitment and we backed out.  I can’t express how strong my disappointment is over this.  

“So how did the Administration inform Prague and Warsaw of its decision?  Reportedly, via late night phone calls and hastily assembled diplomatic envoys.  Apparently, the Czech Prime Minister was woken out of bed after midnight and the Polish Prime Minister refused to answer the phone, suspecting what the news might be.  On top of all this, the announcement came on the 70th anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Poland at the start of World War II.  For a President who has repeatedly stressed the importance of multilateralism and diplomatic re-engagement with the world, this unilateral action was abrupt and sloppy; occurring without the consultations promised to both governments.

“What will be the second and third order effects of this decision?  There’s what we believe, and then there’s what others perceive.  The headline of a daily paper in the Czech Republic read, “No radar.  Russia won.”  An editorial in a respected pro-business Czech newspaper, said: "an ally we rely on has betrayed us, and exchanged us for its own, better relations with Russia, of which we are rightly afraid."  Are we signaling to allies that we’re willing to compromise our relationships with them in order to better our relationship with Russia, or perhaps Iran or North Korea?  Will allies and friends view U.S. commitments more skeptically in the future?  Will Russia and Iran use this decision as an opening to be more assertive in their foreign policy? 

“The Administration’s Russia “reset” policy now seems to have morphed into a Russia “retreat” policy that unsettles our allies and does nothing to discipline Russian behavior. 

“Though the Administration has stated this decision is not a concession to Russia, it sure looks like one.  Whether the timing was intentional or not, on the eve of START negotiations in Geneva, the Administration gave Russia the concession it wanted and got nothing in return. 

“The President has also sought Russian assistance to stop Iran's nuclear programs, signaling that such assistance would lessen the need for the Czech and Polish sites that Moscow has opposed.  Yet we have no indications that Russia will cooperate on Iran and history should teach us to have very low expectations.

“In fact, Prime Minister Putin remarked the day after, "The latest decision by President Obama . . . has positive implications… And I very much hope that this very right and brave decision will be followed by others."  What is clear is that the Kremlin expects shifts in U.S. policy without taking any equivalent action.  Ceding to Russia in areas that affect our national security interests is dangerous and unwise.  

“During his April 5th speech in Prague, the President stated, “As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost-effective and proven.”  Let’s take stock of where we’re at.  The threat clearly persists and I am as yet unconvinced that the new approach is lower risk and more cost-effective at protecting the U.S. and Europe.  Meanwhile, the geopolitical implications resulting from the decision are significant. 

“Finally, perhaps the ultimate litmus test for the Administration’s new approach will be whether it is funded.  Will program investments match the Administration’s new policy?  They’re not off to a good start with a $1.2 billion reduction to the missile defense program in this year’s budget.  I await with keen interest the Fiscal Year 2011 budget request.  

“Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing.”